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TEACHING WHRENTO WHITE KIDS
M.K.B. Darmer*
This Article addresses issues at the intersection of United States v. Whren and
Grutter v. Bollinger at a time when the reality of racial profiling was recently
illustrated by the high-profile arrest of a prominent Harvard professor. Given the
highly racialized nature of criminal procedure, there is a surprising dearth of writing
about the unique problems of teaching issues such as racial profiling in racially
homogeneous classrooms. Because African American and other minority students
often experience the criminal justice system in radically different ways than do
Whites, the lack of minority voices poses a significant barrier to effectively teaching
criminal procedure. This Article critiques current law school pedagogical approaches
and suggests that we must both re-think academic methods for teaching criminal
procedure within the classroom and expose 'post-racial" mythologizing outside the
classroom.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent ascension of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme
Court, like the high-profile arrest of Harvard University Professor Henry
Louis Gates Jr.,' has revivified conversations regarding race-consciousness.
The latter event has also called attention to the continuing reality of racial
profiling. This Article addresses the unique problems of teaching racialized
issues of criminal justice in racially homogeneous classrooms. The Su-
preme Court case United States v. Whren2 implicitly legitimized racial
profiling, and has been roundly condemned by many in the academic
community) The full force of Whren's insidious impact can be easily over-
looked, however, especially by students who themselves have never been
victims of racial profiling. When students of color are present and partici-
patory in classrooms, discussions tend to be more rich and nuanced.When
minority voices are lacking, classes are impoverished. It is difficult to ap-
preciate the full implications of Whren and issues like racial profiling
without the benefit of first-hand narratives describing the ways in which
police officers frequently interact with minorities. Accordingly, we must
re-think the way that criminal procedure is taught, particularly when
classrooms are predominantly White.4
1. See, e.g., Charles Ogletree, Brief Statement on Behalf of Professor Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., E-mail from Charles Ogletree, Jesse Climenko Professor, Harvard Law School,
(July 20, 2009) (describing arrest of Harvard colleague at his own home on suspected
"breaking and entering charge" even after Professor Gates provided valid university identi-
fication bearing his photograph and a driver's license bearing his photo and address)
available at http://www.theroot.cm/views/lawyers-statement-arrest-henry-louis-gates-jr
2. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MiANI L. REv. 425
(1997) and infra notes 23-24, 40 and 51 and accompanying text.
4. Because the Wiren case involved African American defendants, I distinguish
herein primarily between the experiences of "Blacks" and "Whites," while recognizing
that those terms themselves can be ambiguous. Professor Reggie Oh has pointed out that
one can think of whiteness, for example, as a physical, biological, cultural and/or or spatial
construct with "physical whiteness" requiring interpretative observation. (Notes from
Remarks of Professor Reggie Oh, LatCrit XIII Conference, Seattle, WA, Oct. 2008) (on
file with author). It is this "physical whiteness" or "physical blackness" that plays out most
often in the context of racial profiling, with police officers making observations and draw-
ing conclusions based on those observations. My borrowing of the term "White privilege"
from other scholars, in this context, means the privilege experienced by Anglos or those
perceived to be Anglos. It is a privilege that is infrequently experienced by those who are
perceived by law enforcement to be Blacks or Latinas/os. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The
Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law En-
forcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 345-46 (2003) (noting that "Border Patrol Agents routinely
admit that a person's 'Hispanic appearance' contributed to their decision to arrest a per-
son"). Thus, my focus on the experiences of African Americans does not mean to suggest
that other minority groups are not also subject to discriminatory treatment at the hands of
law enforcement. See generally Johnson, supra at 344-45 (detailing experiences of Latinas/os
and Asian Americans).
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This Article draws on the important work of Professor David A.
Harris, which examines the corrosive effects of profiling. David Harris has
made a sustained and systemic critique of the pernicious effects of Whren.
Moreover, his "modest proposal" for greater data collection to effectively
expose the extent of racial profiling has had enormously beneficial effects
in unmasking the full extent of the problem!
While there is abundant scholarship about Whren itself, and many
articles about affirmative action in the wake of Grutter v. Bollinger,6 I focus
here specifically on the problem of homogeneity in many criminal proce-
dure classrooms, an issue underdeveloped in existing scholarship.7 Perhaps
in no other area of the law do Whites and minorities have as vastly differ-
ent experiences as they do in the context of the criminal justice system.
In order to reduce those disparities and improve the system, minority
voices are critical to legal education and legal progress.
Following this Introduction, Part I briefly describes some of the
ways in which minorities and Whites experience the criminal justice sys-
tem differently and provides a description of the Whren case and the
explosion of racial profiling in its aftermath. Part II describes limitations
on the ability to effectively teach racially charged issues when minority
voices are lacking, as they currently too often are in law schools in the
United States. Finally, Part III addresses particular ways in which we may
begin to overcome current limitations endemic to modern legal educa-
tion. I note that my suggestions and conclusions are preliminary, and that
I view this piece as an initial step of a broader and more comprehensive
project.
PART I: RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The premise that minorities and Whites in this country experience
the criminal justice system in radically different ways should be uncontro-
versial; and yet, criticism of the Sotomayor nomination illustrates that
appeals to race-consciousness remain polarizing." Despite that controversy,
it is well documented that, for example, African Americans are incarcer-
ated at much higher rates than are Whites and are more likely to be
5. See, e.g., David Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System:
The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 71,73 (2003).
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
7. 1 am indebted, however, to the scholarship of Professors Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Margalynne J. Armstrong, Stephanie W. Wildman and others with regard to the
importance of a race-conscious pedagogy in the classroom, including a pedagogy that
recognizes the systemic effects of"white privilege."
8. See Editorial, Court Won't Change Much, DESERET MORNING NEWS, (Salt Lake
City, Utah), May 27, 2009 at A10 ("We had hoped that, with the election of President
Barack Obama, Americans were beginning to move away from the politics of a divisive
type of race consciousness.").
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wrongly convicted,9 that there is racial discrimination in capital
sentencing,' ° that the 100-1 sentencing disparity between crack cocaine
and powder cocaine" has fallen disproportionately on African Ameri-
cans, 12 and that in street encounters with police, African Americans and
Latinas/os are likely to be treated quite differently than Anglos."3
Nor does the election of Barack Obama mean that we now live in a
"post-racial" society. While there may be reason to hope that President
Obama will be a strong voice of condemnation with regard to the prac-
tice of racial profiling,' 4 deeply entrenched police practices tend to change
slowly. Moreover, as Professor N. Jeremi Duru has written, "[t]he myth of
inherent black criminality has remained ... stubbornly entrenched in
American consciousness."' 5 The myth was exploited and personified by
the famous "Willie Horton" advertisements during the 1988 Election,
featuring "Horton's dark visage, prominent Afro and unkempt beard
1116
That myth is unlikely to dissolve based on the election of a mixed-
race president a mere twenty years after Horton was described as "'every
suburban mother's greatest fear.' ,,7 As Justice Ginsburg recently recog-
9. See Harris, supra note 5, at 71-72 (conviction rates);Andrew Taslitz,JudgingJena's
D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 417 and n.171
(2009).
10. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Pedagogy of the Suppressed: A Class on Race and the Death
Penalty, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHA GE 547-48, 550 (2007).
11. See Harris, supra note 5, at 72; see also Margalynne J. Armstrong and Stephanie
M. Wildman, A Tribute to Professor John 0. Calmore: Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Trans-
forming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REv. 635, 640 n.15 (2008).
12. See Harris, supra note 5, at 72 ("The 'crack' form of cocaine was much more
commonly possessed by black sellers than by sellers of other races; the powdered form was
found much more commonly among whites.").
13. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text; see also Taslitz, supra note 9, at 419
(noting that "evidence of racial bias in decision making arises at every stage of the criminal
process-from arrest, to the setting of bail, to the effectiveness of defense counsel, to guilty
pleas outcomes, to sentencing."); see also id. at 425-426 (providing specific examples of
different treatment of White and minority defendants) and 434 ("Merely being in court-
rooms and prisons where a black offender sees a sea of nearly all black faces must raise
suspicions that something is amiss.").
14. Obama was, of course, critical of the Gates arrest, but tempered his initial criti-
cism of the Cambridge police after coming under heavy criticism himself for his
statements about the matter.
15. N.Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, The Scottsboro Boys, And The Myth Of The
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 1315, 1342 (2003-2004).
16. John Tehranian, Selective Racialization: Middle Eastern Identity and the Faustian Pact
with Whiteness, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1201, 1209 (2008).
17. Id. at 1209 (quoting Martin Schram, The Making of Willie Horton, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, May 28, 1990, at 17); see also Notes, Presentation of Professor Camille A. Nel-
son, Lat Crit XIII, Oct. 3, 2008 on Examining our Post-Racial Selves: Obama as Balm for
Mhat Ails Us (disagreeing that election means we live in "post-racial" society) (notes on
file with author).
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nized in Grutter, "It is well documented that conscious and unconscious
race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land,
impeding realization of our highest values and ideals "' '" While the specific
practice of racial profiling may decrease under an Obama Administration,
it will not disappear. Police officers will doubtless continue to rely on ra-
cial assumptions.
A. The Reality of 4hite Privilege
Somewhat ironically, I was stopped by a police officer on the way to
the LatCrit XIII conference where I planned to discuss racial aspects of
traffic stops. I was running late when I noticed flashing lights and a siren
unmistakably directed at me. In that moment of being "caught" (I had
rolled through at least one stop sign, and was probably also speeding), I
felt a pang of alarm as I was jolted out of a reverie by the siren.Yet my
alarm was circumscribed, because after all, there were limits to what I
would face. I am a suburban,White female driving a newish but relatively
inexpensive and small SUV. Cops tend to treat people like me pretty well.
Nor has my immediate family suffered from discrimination at the hands
of law enforcement. Despite the fact that my spouse is half Latino and my
children, one quarter Latina/o, their coloring and physiognomy easily
"pass" them as Anglos, and we are routinely waved through border check-
points. Indeed, the only time I have been detained for any length of time
at a border checkpoint was when returning to NewYork from Canada in
the company of a Cuban-American friend in law school.
Thus, despite a slight case of nerves, I was pretty sure of what would
happen and, more importantly, what would not happen: I would not be
frisked. I would not be pulled out of my car. I would not be asked if I had
a weapon. I would not be asked if there were drugs in the car. I would
not be asked if I had a criminal record. I would not be treated harshly. My
whiteness endows me with benefits that were realized that day. The offi-
cer, as expected, treated me politely, gave me a ticket for one offense and a
warning for a second, and allowed me to proceed on my way expedi-
tiously. I benefited directly from "White privilege."
Professors Armstrong and Wildman of Santa Clara Law School ad-
dress the issue of unacknowledged "White privilege" in their important
article, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to Color
Insight.' 9 They draw on the work of Peggy McIntosh, who has provided
the memorable metaphor of a knapsack in describing that privilege:
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (GinsburgJ., concurring); see also
id. at 333-334 (noting that in our society, "race unfortunately still matters") (majority
opinion).
19. See Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching
Whiteness:Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. Rav. 635,645-47 (2008).
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McIntosh explains that white privilege can be likened to "an
invisible package of unearned assets." The holder of this
package remains oblivious to its presence yet can reliably de-
pend on its contents.... "White privilege is like an invisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools,
maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass,
emergency gear, and blank checks." White privilege both
benefits individuals and maintains systematic subordination of
non-Whites. °
It was perhaps only because I had recently heard Professors Arm-
strong and Wildman speak" that I was consciously aware of the privileged
nature of my own encounter with the police on October 2, 2008.
Encounters between African American drivers and the police are fre-
quently much more fraught. Moreover, despite widespread condemnation
of the practice of"racial profiling," such profiling occurs every day on our
roadways.
B. TheWhren Case
The Supreme Court case Vhren v. United States22 is not explicitly
about racial profiling,23 but it insidiously legitimates the practice.24 The
facts are uncomplicated. "Youthful" African American occupants of a dark
Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates attracted the attention of
undercover police officers. 25 The Pathfinder remained stopped at a stop
sign for more than twenty seconds after the police observed the driver
"looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right!' 26 When the po-
lice executed a U-turn to return to the Pathfinder, the truck "turned
suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an 'unreasonable'
20. Id. at 672 (quoting Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege:A Personal
Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in LESLIE BENDER
& DAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAw:A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 23 (1995).
21. They presented their work at the annual Society of American Law Teachers
("SALT") conference in 2008.
22. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
23. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the
"New Federalism" in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 367, 370 (2001)
("At first blush, Whren would seem to have little to do with issues of race, and in fact the
Court decided it in just this way. But on closer examination, we see that the issue of racial
discrimination in the way police enforce the law ran through the whole case, and was
brought directly to the Court's attention.").
24. See I. Bennett Capers, Canaries, The Fourth Amendment, and the Equality Principle
33 (Jan. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, draft on file with the author) (in Whren, "the
Court gave its imprimatur to pretextual stops").
25. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808,810.
26. Id. at 808.
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speed."' 7 Officers approached the Pathfinder, ostensibly to give the young
men a "warning.
'28
Undercover officers, however, are not normally in the business of
'9
monitoring traffic violations. Rather, it appeared that the officers were
motivated to issue the warning in order to do an investigation into poten-
tially more interesting matters. Approaching the Pathfinder for the alleged
purpose of giving a warning put the officer in a position to see into the
vehicle.3 He saw drugs, and arrested the petitioners. 31
The defendants argued that the stop was pretextual. 32 If police con-
duct in that case were allowed to stand, then the extensive nature of the
traffic code would give police officers wide discretion to make stops based
on technical violations as a means to investigate crimes for which "no
probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists."'3 Thus, the petitioners
argued that probable cause to believe a traffic code violation existed
should not alone provide reasonable grounds for a stop under the Fourth
Amendment.34 Rather, the test for reasonableness for traffic stops should
be "whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop
for the reason given."'
35
The Supreme Court disagreed. It is not the Court's job, said Justice
Scalia, to get inside the head of the police officer.36 Scalia wrote for a
unanimous Court. The Court interpreted prior case law to prevent it
from accepting the argument that assessing a traffic stop's "reasonableness"
under the Constitution "depends on the actual motivations of the indi-
vidual officers involved.'37 While the Court agreed that the Constitution
prohibits "selective" enforcement of the law based on race, it located the
remedy for such practices in the Equal Protection Clause, "not the Fourth
Amendment."3 So long as there was probable cause to believe that even a
27. Id.
28. See id. at 808-09. The race of the petitioners is not given in the Court's initial
description of the facts in the opening paragraphs, but is provided on page 810.
29. Indeed, District of Columbia police regulations permitted plainclothes police
officers in unmarked cars "to enforce traffic laws 'only in the case of a violation that is so
grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.'" Id. at 815 (citing Washington,
D.C. Department Policy, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C., General
Order 303.1, pt. 1, Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992)) (emphasis in original).
30. See id. at 808-09.
31. See id. at 808.
32. See id. at 810-12.
33. Id. at 810.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See id. at 813: ("We think [prior] cases foreclose any argument that the constitu-
tional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved.").
37. Id. at 813.
38. Id.
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mere traffic infraction was committed, then the stop was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. In terms of a Fourth Amendment remedy, Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion dismissed concerns about race in a "cavalier"
4)
manner.
Minor traffic violations are ubiquitous. Indeed, we all commit such
infractions almost daily- failing to signal, crossing over a solid line to
change lanes, driving a few miles over the speed limit, failing to come to a
full stop, talking on our cell phones.41 If an officer with a racist agenda
wants to make a stop, he can find a reason.42 Professor Harris has pointed
out the following:
The defendants told the Court in no uncertain terms that the
government's objective standard would give police almost
unlimited discretionary power to stop any driver at any time,
and that police would almost certainly use this power to stop
minorities, especially African Americans, in numbers well out
of proportion to their presence on the road.43
C. The Far-Reaching Tentacles of Whren
Later cases have only broadened the implications of Whren, exacer-
bating the burdens on minority citizens. Since Whren, the Court has held
that it is constitutionally permissible to make an arrest even if someone
commits a misdemeanor offense carrying a maximum penalty of a fine.44
39. See id.
40. Harris, supra note 23, at 370.
41. See, e.g., Harris infra note 43.
42. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (noting contention that because "the use of automo-
biles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules
is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given mo-
torist in a technical violation").
43. Harris, supra note 23, at 375; see also Harris, supra note 5, at 95:
Any veteran police officer will gladly attest that there is no such thing as a
perfect driver. Everyone violates some aspect of the traffic code in some way
during any short drive, and any of these moving or equipment violations
constitutes full probable cause for a stop [after Wren].... Police officers have
always known that the traffic code is law enforcement's friend. It allows an
officer to pull over virtually any driver, almost any time, because everyone
breaks the traffic laws. The flawless driver has not been born, and never will
be. (emphasis added).
44. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Atwater was a case involving a
small town Texas mother's arrest for a failure to restrain her children with seatbelts. There
was no alleged racial motive in that particular case and no indication that the petitioner
subjected to the arrest was a member of a minority group. However, the holding in the
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It is well-settled that an officer who arrests someone also has the author-
ity to make a full warrantless search of the arrestee's person,4" and of the
entire passenger compartment of the car (at least if the defendant remains
nearby) .46 Thus, under the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, an
officer can stop anyone who commits any sort of traffic infraction, consti-
tutionally arrest the person regardless of the potential penalty, then
conduct a full search of the car and the person. This is an extraordinary
license for intrusion for the commitment of a mere traffic infraction.
In its most recent case in this line, Virginia v. Moore,47 the Court up-
held the Fourth Amendment validity of a search, even though it was based
upon an arrest that was impermissible under state law. In that case, police
arrested a motorist for driving with a suspended license; Virginia state law
provided that a summons should be used and did not give the police law-
ful authority to arrest in such circumstances. Nevertheless, police made an
arrest, triggering a "search incident to arrest" that proved fruitful. Because
Virginia state law did not provide for the exclusionary rule for evidence
obtained unlawfully under state law, the defendant raised a Fourth
Amendment claim. He argued that, under the federal Constitution, a valid
search incident to arrest must be incident to a lawful arrest. The Court,
however, in another opinion penned by Justice Scalia, held that the search
was not unlawful for Fourth Amendment purposes even though in con-
travention of state law.
Moore continues the trend of broadening police authority to stop
and search any motorist who commits a minor traffic violation. Most of-
ten this license goes unexercised. Indeed, it would largely be a waste of
time for the police to arrest and search everyone who commits such vio-
lations. But some people are routinely searched and otherwise subject to
indignities based on minor violations. Those people tend to be Black."
The ability of police officers to make traffic stops without providing
race-neutral reasons is sharply different from the requirement that
case has pernicious effects on minority drivers, because it further broadens police author-
ity to make stops and arrests on the roadways.
45. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
46. See NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see also Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615 (2004) (authorizing police to search the entire passenger compartment of a
car when the arrestee was a "recent occupant" of the car); cf Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542,
slip op. at 18 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009) (search of arrestee's car deemed unreasonable where
defendant was handcuffed in back of patrol car and not in a position to reach inside his
own car to grab anything).
47. No. 06-1082, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 21, 2009).
48. See David Harris, The Stories, the Statisitcs, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MiN s. L. Rv. 265, 269-70 (1999) ("Talk to almost any black person any place
in the country and you will hear accounts of pretextual traffic stops. Some say they have
experienced it many times. All of those interviewed-not criminals trying to explain any
wrongdoing, but people with good jobs and families-described an experience common
to blacks, but almost invisible to whites.").
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prosecutors provide race-neutral reasons for challenging minorities when
selecting juries.49 Under the dictates of equal protection, of course, police
officers, no less than prosecutors are forbidden to discriminate based on
race. 0 But the practical effect of Ihren is that most victims of racial dis-
crimination on the roadways are left without a remedy. Anomalously, the
net result of the Court's holding in Whren is that a traffic stop later
deemed unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause can still be
deemed "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. For an unconstitu-
tional stop to be reasonable under a different provision is a cramped
reading of constitutional protections that effectively leaves minority driv-
ers vulnerable to systematic discrimination. Making out an equal
protection violation often involves years of study and the amassing and
analysis of statistical data.5' Unfortunately, "[w]hatever else the Fourth
Amendment does or used to do, it will no longer serve as a tool to pre-
vent racially biased policing" after Whren.52
The academic community has made powerful and sustained argu-
ments about the pernicious effects of Whren. As David Harris has argued,
"[p]retextual traffic stops aggravate years of accumulated feelings of injus-
tice, resulting in deepening distrust and cynicism by African Americans
about police and the entire criminal justice system. 53
D. Recent Evidence of Racial Profiling
More than twelve years after "hren, evidence is overwhelming that
racial profiling permeates police practice. On October 20, 2008, the
ACLU of Southern California released a report documenting extensive
racial disparities in traffic stops in Los Angeles.The report was prepared by
Ian Ayres, an economist and professor at Yale Law School and Yale School
of Management and his research assistant,Jonathan Borowsky.1
4
The report was based on more than 700,000 traffic and pedestrian
stops by Los Angeles police officers in the one-year period between July
49. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. U.S. ConsT., amend. XIV; see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (noting that the "constitu-
tional basis" for objecting to discriminatory application of laws by police is the Equal
Protection Clause).
51. See Harris, supra note 23, at 376 n.52 ("For a catalogue of the formidable array
of legal obstacles and practical difficulties plaintiffs in such Equal Protection Clause suits
would face, see [Tracey] Macin, [Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333,
365] at n.22 [(1998)]." Cf Harris, supra note 23, at 379-381 (discussing statistical analysis
done with respect to selective prosecution claim made in New Jersey).
52. Harris, supra note 23, at 376.
53. Harris, supra note 48, at 268.
54. The ACLU report is available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/lapdracialprofiling; see
also Ian Ayres, Racial Profiling and the LAPD, Op-Ed, L.A.TMES (Oct. 23, 2008).
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2003 and July 2004.5 Ayres found that for every 10,000 residents, 4,569
Blacks were stopped. ForWhites, only 1,750 were stopped. For Latinas/os,
1,773 were stopped. 6 Moreover, "[s]topped Blacks are 127% more likely
to be frisked-and stopped Latinos are 43% more likely to be frisked-
than stopped Whites.
' 7
After the initial stop, police are also likely to treat members of mi-
nority groups more harshly, even though such tactics do not appear to be
effective in actually uncovering evidence of criminality. Professor Ayres
noted the following:
Stopped Blacks are 76% more likely to be searched, and
stopped Latinos are 16% more likely to be searched than
stopped Whites.
Stopped Blacks are 29% more likely to be arrested, and
stopped Latinos are 32% more likely to be arrested than
stopped Whites.
... Although stopped Blacks were 127% more likely to be
frisked than stopped Whites, they were 42.3% less likely to be
found with a weapon after they were frisked, 25% less likely to
be found with drugs and 33% less likely to be found with
other contraband.We found similar patterns for Latinos.58
Not surprisingly based on this data, Professor Ayres concluded that
there are "grave concerns that African Americans and Latinos in Los
Angeles are ... 'over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched and
55. Ayres, supra note 54. The report's author noted that Los Angeles Police Chief
William J. Bratton had rejected the study's finding because of the age of the data (more
than four years old at the time of the study's release). Ayres defended the use of that par-
ticular data because the department "ha[d] not released the more recent stop data ... nor
... analyzed the more recent data for racial disparities." Id.
56. Executive Summary, ACLU report, supra note 54; cf Harris, supra note 48, at
275-88 (analyzing statistical data for other communities in earlier years). For example, on
the New Jersey Turnpike between 1988 and 1991, "73.2% of those stopped and arrested
were black, while only 13.5% of the cars on the road had a black driver or passenger." Id.
at 279.
57. Ayres, supra note 54. The study controlled for "violent crime rates and property
crime rates in specific neighborhoods, as well as a host of other variables .... Id.
58. Ayres, supra note 54, at 1-2. Moreover:
Not only did we find that African Americans and Latinos were subjected to
more stops, frisks, searches and arrests than Whites, we also found that these
additional pohce actions aren't because of the fact that people of color live in
higher-crime areas or because they more often carry drugs or weapons, or
any other legitimate reason that we can discern from the rich set of data we
examined.
Id. at2.
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over-arrested.' ,9 Despite the prevalence of these disturbing police prac-
tices, students in the nation's law schools are sometimes impervious to
them.
PART II:THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CLASSROOM
In Part I, I described my own relatively unintimidating encounter
with the police on October 2, 2008. JS, an African American student in
one of my classes, had a very different experience at the hands of police
some months earlier. He was made to get out of his car and wait for a
prolonged period. He was asked if he had a record. He was asked if he had
a gun. He was asked if he had drugs in the car and the officer did react
with disbelief that he was not a criminal. JS was my student recently in
criminal procedure, and he related this story during our discussion of
Whren.60 He was the only Black male in the class. His story was unique in
that class and one of only a handful that have made their way into my
classrooms in the nine and one-half years I have been teaching.
Indeed, not once do I recall a female African American student shar-
ing a story of racial profiling; perhaps that is because I can count the
number of Black women students I have had on two hands. And, while it
may be common to assume that the "crime" of "DWB" (Driving While
Black) is most often charged to Black men, discussions of racial profiling
too frequently ignore the fact that Black women are also its victims.
Whether assumed to be "drug mules" at airports or treated rudely on the
roadways, Black women are also subjected to racist stereotyping by law
61enforcement.
Real stories from real people who have been victims of racial profil-
ing have an impact on fellow students (and teachers) that provide critical
context for cases like Whren. But it is all too easy for White students,
many from privileged backgrounds,6 2 to overlook or not discern the ra-
cialized dimensions of Whren.
59. Id. at 1.
60. This story is used with his permission.
61. See notes from Latcrit XIII conference (on file with author); see also Johnson,
supra note 4, at 349 (noting that, at the border, Black women are "more likely to be subject
to intrusive searches" than any other group, including the fact that Black female U.S. citi-
zens are nine times more likely than White female citizens to be subject to x-ray searches,
despite the fact that they are less than half as likely as White female citizens to be found
carrying contraband as a result of those x-ray searches); Harris, supra note 48, at 270-271
(detailing experience of Karen Blank, a social worker pulled over based upon mistaken
information regarding traffic tickets and placed in "handcuffs so tight that they left ugly
red marks on her wrists for several days").
62. A colleague at my law school described one popular city in our county, New-
port Beach, California, as "the former hometown of John Wayne and an oceanside hamlet
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Simply reading Scalia's opinion in Whren will not give students a
true sense of the racialized dynamics lurking beneath its surface. When
the Court was forced to confront earlier cases in which it had suggested
that police activity was justified because it was not based on pretext, Scalia
coolly pronounced the following:
[O]nly an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as en-
dorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police
conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to be-
lieve that a violation of the law has occurred. In each [prior]
case we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in
the absence of probable cause.6 3
Under Scalia's reasoning, a finding of"probable cause" regarding any traf-
fic infraction whatever obviates the need for determining an officer's
motive. Scalia skimmed over the crucial point made by petitioners that in
the context of the traffic code, there will almost always be probable cause
to believe that some violation has occurred, leaving minority drivers open
to abuse. One can profile with impunity because, in essence, "Whren
means that police officers can stop any driver, any time they are willing to
follow the car for a short distance.
' 64
Scalia briefly discussed the traffic code argument at the end of the
hren opinion:
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the
"multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations" is
so large and difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone
is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost
whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no prin-
ciple that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law
becomes so expansive and commonly violated that infraction
itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness
of enforcement."
Scalia's stated concern that no "principle" would have allowed the
Court to find for the petitioners ignores the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment itself-its requirement that no search be "unreasonable" is surely
flexible enough to allow consideration of the risk of an officer's abuse of
discretion where a labyrinthine code gives him carte blanche to stop vir-
tually anyone. Particularly when one considers that the police conduct in
renowned as a bastion of wealth and white conservatism." Tehranian, supra note 16, at
1225.
63. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (emphasis in original).
64. Harris, supra note 48, at 311.
65. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
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Whren itself violated internal regulations, that violation could surely have
buttressed a finding of "unreasonableness."
By not fully engaging the petitioners' arguments, Scalia's bold and
conclusory statements masked the problem of increased racial profiling
that was inevitably wrought by the Whren opinion. And perhaps because
the opinion was unanimous, relatively brief, and purported to resolve an
easy case, it attracted little press attention in its immediate aftermath. 66 It
was not immediately plain what the Supreme Court had allowed.
A. Teaching Whren in the Mostly White Classroom
The tepid response to hren is often reflected, years later, in White
classrooms, despite intervening years of sensitizing to the prevalence of
racial profiling and the entry into the lexicon of terms like "driving while
Black." A typical discussion in my mostly-White classroom might demon-
strate an exchange such as the following:
Regardless of whether there are minority students in the class, I in-
variably call on a White student to recite the facts so as not to put anyone
"on the spot". 67 The student reciting the facts may sound vaguely bored:
"Youths in a Pathfinder. U-turn. Car sped away at a high rate of speed.
Cops stopped the car. Saw drugs; arrested." If she recites the law straight
from the case, it will sound benign. There is probable cause. There's a traf-
fic violation. It's an objective standard.
"What's really going on here?" I might ask, looking for some pas-
sion. To me it seems obvious, but to be fair to the students, I have read the
case repeatedly, mined it for all potential clues to underlying motivations,
and have read studies and numerous scholarly articles about racial profil-
ing and the pernicious effects of Whren. Why should these things jump
out at a White student from Orange County, who likely views law en-
forcement officials as helpful allies?
"It's a high crime area," someone might say.
66. Professor Harris notes that Whren received "rather perfunctory coverage" in the
news media, and even among the large news organizations that covered it, "few high-
lighted the racial implications of the decision." Harris, supra note 23, at 391.
67. Professor Crenshaw describes the experience of minority "subjectification":
This is experienced by minority students when, after learning to leave their
race at the door, their racial identities are unexpectedly dragged into the
classroom by their instructor to illustrate a point or to provide the basis for a
command performance of "show and tell." The eyes of the class are suddenly
fixed upon the minority student who is then expected to offer some sort of
minority "testimony."
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education,
11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1, 6 (1988).
[VOL. 15:109
Teaching Whren to White Kids
"Come on," I think. "Someone get to the point:'
Finally someone might offer, "They're African Americans." And
might add, "It could be racist:'
"Right," I think. "Could be? Finally."
It's a case about racial profiling, but most White kids don't under-
stand that. It's a spare Scalian opinion, claiming the moral high ground,
easily dispatching the very real concern for the racial impact of the case.
The opinion admits of no self-doubt, betrays no tortured reflection about
what the repercussions might be. The racial dimension is quickly dis-
patched. Thus, while the opinion has been described as a "slap in the face
to African Americans and other minority group members who must suf-
fer the indignities of these stops, 68 White students, unscathed, often miss
its meaning.
Indeed, I thought the significance of Whren might be missed in my
recent class, before I saw JS's hand go up. Because he was the only Black
man in the room, I confess to a keen awareness of his presence.Yet I dared
not look directly at him, for fear that he might read in my glance what
could be perceived, perhaps fairly, as an almost voyeuristic hope that he
might "have a story.,69 My recollection is that he put his hand up and
then down again as others were talking, perhaps frustrated that his class-
mates were largely missing the point. I believe I read his tentative hand as
a license to prod, at least gently. "Was there another hand up?"
B. The Power of Personal Narrative
JS's story had an impact. In ways my secondhand stories never could,
his first-person account revealed the real problem with hren. JS is an
engaging student, seemingly well-liked by his peers. He is voluble, at
times, and funny. He told his story in enough detail to make a lasting im-
pression, at least on me. He sounded outraged by the suspicious questions
he was asked on the roadside, by the treatment he received, by the officer's
incredulous responses that no, he did not have a record and no, there was
not contraband in the car. He revealed that his family was likewise
68. Harris, supra note 23, at 376. Harris notes that it is particularly remarkable that
the Court "[birushed the Fourth Amendment aside [and] ... did exactly what the defen-
dants warned against: gave law enforcement carte blanche to stop any driver, at any time,
with only the none-too-potent threat of a lawsuit to deter racially biased law enforcement
in the face of evidence that this was already happening." Id. (footnote omitted; emphasis in
original).
69. Cf Harris, supra note 23, at 326 ("It is virtually impossible to find black people
who do not feel that they have experienced racial profiling.").
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outraged; calls were made, complaints lodged, legal action contemplated.
This was not a small matter in the life of this aspiring lawyer. M
Importantly, JS is decidedly not Michael A. Whren or James L.
Brown, the hapless protagonists/petitioners in the court case. JS, unlike
those men, was innocent-at least of anything beyond the myriad traffic
infractions many of us commit almost daily.i' Whren and Brown, on the
other hand, were decidedly guilty. There were drugs in the car, after all.
That may be why the case does not spark outrage. But the problem, as we
know, is that innocents like JS are all too often caught up in the web of
stereotyping, aggressive policing, offensive questioning and rude if not
abusive treatment that are the frequent hallmarks of African Americans'
encounters with the police.
When police racially profile and turn out to be right about their
suspicions, however illegitimate, it is tempting for a White person to
smugly think: Well of course. Assumptions about Black criminality are
deeply culturally engrained.72 As David Harris has noted, police chiefs
have argued that "allegations" of racial profiling are "nothing more than
the excuses of criminals hoping to 'play the race card' to escape the con-
sequences of their law breaking ... even in the face of stories from
upstanding black and Latino individuals who had never been charged
with anything, but who had been treated at a roadside as if they were
criminals."
7 3
It is one thing to read concerns about racism articulated by the law-
yers for the obviously guilty Whren, concerns readily dismissed by Scalia
and likely by law students, as well. Whren's lawyers may have pointed out
the broader racial implications of a decision that condoned the police be-
havior in Whren, but their immediate concern was getting a guilty client
off the hook, a concern that perhaps enables us to view their broader
claims regarding social justice with suspicion. Such claims probably carry
greater weight if coming from an innocent person; but if that person is an
abstraction, the resonance of the claim is limited. When a peer and friend,
70. The fact that JS may have had the resources and support to complain to au-
thorities in the aftermath of his experience did not in any way appear to negate the anger
he still felt about the incident. See also Harris, supra note 48, at 269-275 (recounting other
citizens' experiences with racial profiling, and describing profound reactions of embar-
rassment and depression). Many victims of racial profiling, of course, may not have the
resources, time or inclination to navigate a system for lodging complaints about the prac-
tice.
71. Harris, supra note 5, at 95 (noting that drivers violate some aspect of the traffic
code on any short drive).
72. Duru, supra note 15. See also Taslitz, supra note 9, at 414-418 (discussing the
problem of stigma connected to mere "proximity" to the criminal justice system).
73. Harris, supra note 5, at 75.
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however, tells a personal story about how racial profiling has affected him,
the resonance is deeper. Personal narrative can be enormously powerful.74
Unfortunately, all too often my students do not hear stories like that
of JS. When there are only one or two African American students in a
class, the chances diminish that those students "have stories" or would be
comfortable telling them to a largely-White peer group. Moreover, when
the numbers of minorities are small, a lack of critical mass can make par-
ticipation difficult for the minority students.
C. The Grutter Decision and the Importance of "Critical Mass"
In Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Grutter v. Bollinger,
which approved the use of race as a "plus factor" in law school admissions,
she explicitly noted the importance of achieving a "critical mass" of ni-
nority students. Citing to arguments made by the University of Michigan
Law School in support of its admissions program, she explained that "[als
part of it goal of'assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically
qualified and broadly diverse"' it sought to "'enroll a "critical mass" of
minority students.' "7 Justice O'Connor traced the roots of admissions
policies like Michigan Law School's to the Court's earlier "landmark" de-
cision in Bakke,76 in which Justice Powell's concurring opinion endorsed a
"properly devised admission program involving the competitive consid-
,,77
erations of race and ethnic origin.
The later Grutter Court found substantial benefits in achieving a
"critical mass," including promoting understanding between the races and
breaking down stereotypes. The law school persuasively demonstrated a
compelling state interest in securing the "educational benefits of a diverse
student body," satisfying the demands of "strict scrutiny" under an equal
74. The power of narrative was brought home to me in an entirely different context
recently. Chapman's Outlaw group co-sponsored an event entitled, Proposition 8 Passed:
Now Wat? It was an unabashed advocacy forum, following on the heels of an earlier,
dryer presentation regarding the California Supreme Court's decision to hear a petition
challenging Proposition 8.Two students spoke at the forum, giving the most moving pres-
entations I have ever heard in an academic setting. They gave raw and searing accounts of
the impact of Proposition 8 on their personal lives. Following the forum, several students
approached their peers and said it was one of the most compelling educational experi-
ences they had had. See also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 49 How. L.J. 121, 121-28 (2004)
(example of a compelling personal narrative describing feelings of powerlessness experi-
enced by an African American Assistant United States Attorney who was asked whether he
would prefer to go to a restaurant other than one in South Carolina which had been rec-
ommended, which was festooned with Confederate flags). I have returned to the Capers
article several times since reading it the first time, finding each time that the personal ac-
count is evocative and haunting.
75. 539 U.S. at 329.
76. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
77. Id. at 320 (Powell,J., concurring).
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protection analysis when racial classifications are implicated.7" Justice
O'Connor noted that "[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or hav-
ing particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's
views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority
in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.
7 9
Professor I. Bennett Capers has described critical mass this way:
Critical mass is not simply numerical. Rather, a critical mass
implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on dis-
play, where one does not feel the opprobrium of being a token,
nor the burden of being the designated representative for an
entire group. It also implies a climate where one can speak
freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice that will be
heard. In the Justice Department, a critical mass was what we
lacked. 0
Critical mass is likewise lacking at many law schools, like Chapman.
Overall enrollment in the nation's law schools has declined in recent
years.8 1 According to recent statistics, there were only 9529 Blacks en-
rolled in ABA-accredited schools in 2006, a decline from 9779 the prior
year. 2 Moreover, census data reflects that, in 2000, minority attorneys
comprised only 14.2% of United States lawyers and only 4.4% of law
partners despite constituting 37.3% of the general population . 3
The problem of underrepresentation of minorities on law school
faculties is also acute. Ten years ago, Professor Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw wrote that "[m]inority students across the country have waged
a series of protests to draw attention to problems of diversity in the na-
78. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-333.
79. Id. at 333.
80. Capers, supra note 74, at 122-23. I. Bennett Capers was my colleague in the
United States Attorney's Office in Manhattan from 1995 to 1999. He notes that, when his
article Flags was written, only four of the approximately 241 lawyers in our former office
were African American, "a drop from the usual number of African American prosecutors,
which is 7." Id. at 121 n.1; see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguises: An Empirical
Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action (forthcoming IND. L.J.) (available
on SSRN, http://ssrn.abstract=1324706) (defining "critical mass" and explaining its im-
portance).
81. See Lawrence Hurley, Review of Accreditation Process Urged, L.A. DAILY L.J. at 1
(Dec. 13,2007).
82. Id.; see also ABA Section on Legal Education: Out of the Box Committee, "Law
Schools, Diversity and the Pipeline" 1 (Nov. 2008) ("The legal profession is currently over
90% white and 80% of the law students are white. In contrast, only 70% of the U.S. popu-
lation is white and the percentage of whites as a proportion of the U.S. population is
expected to continue to decrease. However, the proportion of minorities in law schools is
not increasing to the same degree as the population-and in some instances the number
and percentage of minorities in law school is actually decreasing.") (footnotes omitted).
83. See Charles Calleros, Patching Leaks in the Diversity Pipeline to Law Schools and the
Bar, 43 CMA.W L. REv. 131 n.3 (2006).
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tion's law schools.... [T]he students' bottom line demand is often for the
recruitment of more minority faculty and students. 84 A lack of faculty
diversity remains a problem today.8s
PART III: ENRICHING AN IMPOVERISHED CLASSROOM
Once we accept, as I think we must, that minorities experience the
criminal justice system very differently than Whites do, what do we do if
the classroom does not include minority voices on either side of the po-
dium? Plainly, we must continue to advocate for greater diversity in law
school admissions and appointments. That proposal, of course, suggests the
question, "What is meant by diversity?" There are those on both sides of
the political divide who find it offensive to define diversity simply in
terms of skin color. Moreover, where "affirmative action" is employed,
minorities can face stigmatization if perceived as less qualified than White
86
counterparts.
In a paper that generated considerable interest at LatCrit XIII, how-
ever, Professor Deirdre Bowen suggested that the termination of many
affirmative action programs at various universities has not had the pre-
sumed effect of removing from minority students a presumption of being
less qualified than White counterparts.87 Rather, she presented powerful
evidence that eliminating affirmative action programs increases the stigma-
tization of minorities, who now appear in fewer numbers, continue to
face a presumption that they are less qualified despite race-blind admis-
sions, and suffer as a result of a lack of the type of "critical mass" described
above.88
While I believe that race can be a useful proxy for particular life ex-• 89
periences in a racialized society, and that the Grutter decision was
84. Crenshaw, supra note 67, at 1-2.
85. See L. Darnell Weeden, Back to the Future: Should Grutter's Diversity Rationale
Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated? 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 511, 513-514
(2005) (focusing on lack of faculty diversity at elite institutions).
86. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J, dissenting); see generally CLARENCE THO-
MAs, My GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR (2008) (raising concerns about stigmatization); cf.
Weeden, supra note 85, at 514 ("In my opinion, true intellectual diversity is a color blind
educational benefit and it should never be confused with the race-based intellectual diver-
sity theory approved in Grutter."). I benefited greatly by the insightful comments of
ProfessorWeeden at the LatCrit XIII conference.
87. See Bowen supra note 80; see also Notes, Lat Crit XIII Conference (Bowen Pres-
entation, Oct. 3, 2008) (on file with author) (hereinafter Notes of Bowen Presentation).
88. See generally Bowen, supra note 80. She notes that "[u]nder-represented minority
students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and
external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states." Id. at 3; see also Notes of
Bowen Presentation, supra note 87.
89. It is, of course, an imperfect proxy. Not all members of particular minority
groups share the same life experiences, and some White individuals face significant
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well-reasoned, 90 there is room for a more focused approach to admissions
and hiring that addresses a desire for a greater range of perspectives. It
would surely be legitimate to make the following statement to potential
hires or admits: "We as an institution are committed to diversity in a
broad sense. We are interested in knowing how your own unique back-
ground or experiences will contribute to diversity." For potential admits,
an explanation could be written in the context of an application essay.
Where diversity goals remains unrealized, I think we must ensure
that our classes are not narrowly focused on hierarchical perspectives, with
the status quo accepted as an inevitable "given." We can borrow, for ex-
ample, from the suggestions that Professor Goldfarb has made about the
importance of"contextualizing" case law. This might be done with Whren,
for example, by studying that case alongside Scalia's later opinion in Moore,
and pointing out that in both contexts, Scalia noted that police ignored
procedures forbidding arrests and yet found no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion. A desire to unfetter police from regulatory constraints while the
police themselves enforce labyrinthine codes seems to animate Scalian
jurisprudence in this area.
Scalia's protestations notwithstanding, an elegantly simple principle
that could have guided a finding of unreasonableness in the Whren case
was the fact that police officers violated internal regulations forbidding
plain clothes officers from making traffic stops. The notion implicit in
Whren that its holding was preordained and that no alternative would
have made plausible sense of Fourth Amendment doctrine is preposterous.
As Professor Goldfarb argues, case law must be read contextually in order
to expose underlying motivations and assumptions. 9 Moreover, "[t]his
approach is especially promising when used to examine cases concerning
American criminal justice because the methodology can be directed to-
ward highlighting the attitudes found within mainstream legal culture for
inflicting state violence on the disempowered"
92
A. The Limits of the Case Method in Criminal Procedure
On a more long-term basis, I think that we must reconsider the way
we teach Criminal Procedure. The case method, while conventional,
serves to reinforce stereotypes. When the race of a defendant is identified
hardships based upon socioeconomic and other factors. Moreover, some members of mi-
nority groups have not faced the sorts of problems identified in this Article. But see Harris,
supra note 23, at 326 ("It is virtually impossible to find black people who do not feel that
they have experienced racial profiling."). Given the continued relevance of race as a pre-
dictor of certain experiences, having a "critical mass" of minorities increases the chances
that someone in a given classroom will have had an experience of racial profiling.
90. But seeWeeden, supra note 85, at 514 (criticizing Grutter).
91. See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 549.
92. Id.
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in our cases, it is almost always a minority identification. Cases like Jhren
itself are about Black men being caught doing crimes. Indeed, virtually all
of those actors who are identified as Black in our criminal procedure
casebooks are criminals; Latinos are similarly frequently identified as
criminals. Leading criminal procedure cases include Miranda v. Arizona,
where petitioner Miranda, who was found guilty after trial of kidnapping
and rape, is identified as an "indigent Mexican defendant" and a "seriously
disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies"; petitioner Stewart
is identified as "an indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of
school in the sixth grade., 93 In Florida v. J.L., J.L. is identified as one of
three "black males" who was "'hanging out'" at a bus stop where he was
carrying a concealed firearm without a license.
94
There are other examples, including those in which the guilt of the
defendants is in question and yet race is identified in some negative way.
In some historic cases, courts use terminology that is pejorative and/or
paternalistic, as in Brown v. Mississippi where a 1930s judge referred to the
defendants as "ignorant negroes.'" 9' Brown is a case where it is plain that
racist Southern attitudes contributed to the torture of Black defendants.
(A deputy sheriff in the case is quoted as saying that the defendants were
whipped," 'but not too much for a negro.' ,)96 In such cases, as in Whren
itself, where the defendants were victims of racism, the defendants' race is
plainly relevant. Likewise, in Florida v. J. L., where the court analyzes an
anonymous tip that includes the race of the suspect, race is relevant to the
court's analysis.
On the other hand, when we consider the rarity of a court's identi-
fication of a White defendant as being White, it is plain that those
criminals or criminal defendants identified in our cases (and thus our case
books) as having a racial or ethnic identity are usually minorities. Particu-
larly in classrooms where the vast majority of students are White, this
tends to exacerbate an existing problem. Minority voices are absent, and
the identified minorities in the room are simply the subjects of criminal
cases.
In his essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, Profes-
sor Stephanos Bibas posits that there is an "enduring tension between self-
interested insiders and excluded outsiders" in the criminal justice system.97
Bibas identifies as "insiders"judges, police and prosecutors."
93. JEROLD H. ISRAEL,YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND NANCY J. KING, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 356 (2008) (hereinafter "CRIMINAL PROCEDURE")
(quoting Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,457 (1966)).
94. Florida v.J.L., 529 U.S. 266,268 (2000).
95. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,281 (1936).
96. Brown, 297 U.S. at 284.
97. 81 N.YU.L. R.Ev. 911,913 (2006).
98. Id. at 912.
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Those "insiders," however, occupying positions of relative prestige
and power, are rarely, if ever, identified by race. In such instances, those
actors may be imbued by our students with a presumption of "white-
ness." 99 This reinforces the notion that the role played by minorities in the
system is that of criminal defendant and outsider.
Of course, as pointed out in Part I, minority defendants are indeed
over-represented in the criminal justice system. But because there are
many White defendants who are virtually never identified as White in the
cases themselves, case books present an even more imbalanced picture
than the criminal justice system itself. This may serve to foster stereotypes
and contribute to a vicious cycle.
Admittedly, identifying this problem is much easier than offering a
meaningful solution. Should casebook authors search records to make an
effort to identify White defendants in cases where courts themselves do
not identify them? In some high profile cases, such identifying data may
be readily available, but surely not in many. On the other hand, stripping
out references to minority identifications in many cases would dilute ar-
guments made by defendants themselves where racially charged
interactions between police and defendants are alleged. Even where de-
fendants do not make arguments about race, "whitewashing" any court's
reference to a defendant's race or ethnic background is potentially prob-
lematic for another reason: it may not allow students themselves to
critically analyze whether subtle issues of race influenced a court's deci-
sion in some way.
Perhaps as a preliminary step it would be useful for casebook au-
thors or professors in class to point out, in introductory pages or sessions,
the fact that courts and the media-particularly in the past-have been
much more likely to identify a defendant by race or ethnic background
when the defendant is a member of a racial minority. Challenging stu-
dents to be mindful of racial identifications in cases and to ask whether
the identification of race is relevant may enable students to themselves
more critically assess the racialized nature of criminal justice. As Professor
Andrew Taslitz has recently pointed out, "even subconsciously racially
tinged cumulative media coverage-such as showing more Blacks in
'perp' walks; broadcasting Black faces in connection with violent crimes,
white faces for non-violent ones; covering the causes of'ghetto' and racial
99. See Devon W Carbodo & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96
CAL. L. REv. 1139, 1180 (2008) ("[A] line of research in social psychology suggests that in
the absence of an indication that a person is not white, the default presumption is that the
person is white."). Cf Tehranian, supra note 16, at 1218-1222 (noting that the process of
"selective racialization" means that those of ambiguous race, such as Middle Easterners in
American society, are treated as "white" so long as they do not transgress societal norms
but are racialized as "others" as soon as they become "transgressive").
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gang violence-can help to associate racial group membership with the
worst of crimes.'1 °
At the same time, a court's failure to mention race where race may
be relevant poses problems as well. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court failed to
mention that John Terry was Black, despite the police officer's description
of Terry and his companion as "two Negroes."' '1 While the Court in Terry
went so far as to acknowledge that its holding permitting stops and frisks
based upon "reasonable suspicion" might well impact minority communi-
ties more dramatically than others, its failure to acknowledge that Terry
himself may have been "racially profiled" fails to fully acknowledge the
problem. 
02
We should also consider moving beyond a narrow "case law"
method to an approach that provides richer context to our classrooms for
a critical study of criminal justice. Casebooks could be more balanced if
they included not only cases where defendants are inevitably guilty, but
also newspaper articles and studies on racial profiling, studies demonstrat-
ing the disproportionate rate of wrongful convictions among .inorities'
0 3
and articles regarding police searches and shootings of innocents. When
we make it more plain that police tactics profoundly influence the inno-
cent as well as the guilty, a robust interpretation of constitutional rights is
more palatable.
Furthermore, one could easily preface the teaching of Whren with a
law review article such as Professor Duru's Myth of The Bestial Black
Man,10 4 which powerfully exposes underlying racism in our criminal jus-
tice system. One could follow Whren with excerpts from David Harris's
powerful indictments of the case and an analysis of the ACLU data dis-
cussed in Part I.
In the all-White or mostly-White classroom, moreover, more must
be done to make clear to White students that they see the system through
a lens of privilege. As Professors Armstrong and Wildman have persua-
sively argued, "[i]dentifying and understanding whiteness should be an
essential component of legal education. °"'5' Without conscious awareness,
students and faculty alike too easily fall into an acceptance of the
100. Taslitz, supra note 9, at 438.
101. Capers, supra note 24, at n. 182 (citing Louis Stokes, Representing John W Terry, 72
ST.JOHN'S LAW. REV. 727,729 (1998)).
102. For a critical discussion of Terry, see Capers, supra note 24, at 37-39. As Professor
Capers puts it, "[i]f the Fourth Amendment itself has a poisonous tree, its name is Terry v.
Ohio."
103. See Taslitz, supra note 9, at 417 and n.171 (addressing studies regarding wrongful
conviction rates including wrongful convictions based on wrongful identifications and
false confessions).
104. Duru, supra note 72.
105. Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 19, at 635. I should note that I benefited
greatly from hearing a version of this paper presented in person at the annual SALT con-
ference in San Francisco in 2008.
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prevailing power dynamic. More insidiously, they do not recognize that
they are the beneficiaries of privilege:
Within this community of whiteness, the academy replicates
itself as a predominately white institution serving predominately
white interests. This replication impacts how students study
law, and it further reproduces itself as they enter the legal pro-
fession. Legal educators must name and talk about whiteness to
identify this cycle and move toward more inclusive practices.1°
B. Exposing the "Post-Racial" Myth Outside the Classroom
Moving beyond the four walls of our classrooms, we must continue
to resist the force of "post-racial" mythologizing, particularly in our aca-
demic communities. Some academics might argue that legitimate
diversity means only diversity of "viewpoint" because society is, or should
be, color-blind and oblivious to distinctions of race, ethnic background,
gender and sexual orientation.
Wishful thinking aside, we do not live in a "post-racial" society, as
the October 20, 2008107 study regarding police encounters strikingly re-
vealed. Achieving greater social justice may require further exposing racial
disparities, not covering them up. Professors Armstrong and Wildman per-
suasively demonstrate the endemic nature of White privilege, and
particularly where our faculties as well as our student bodies are donii-
nantly White, we must engage that reality.
In the realm of politics, post-racial mythologizing can be particularly
insidious. 18 Ballot initiatives, for example, that propose limits on gathering
statistical data regarding the race of those stopped for traffic stops, can be
made to sound benign and indeed progressive. However, as David Harris
has powerfully demonstrated, the "You can't prove it" defense can be
readily deployed when statistical data is unavailable. 0 9 A claim that we live
in a post-racial society and therefore do not need such data collection
often masks a desire to make pernicious practices unprovable.
CONCLUSION
Racial profiling exists, but too many students at our largely White
legal institutions do not fully appreciate it. The Whren case itself never
uses the term; it takes much more than study of that court's opinion to
106. Id. at 658.
107. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
108. See Harris, supra note 5, at 93-94 (discussing claims that racial profiling is a
"myth").
109. Id. at 75.
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appreciate the realities of the practice. Today's law students are tomorrow's
lawyers, judges, legislators and even presidents. Rather than teaching in a
way that reinforces White privilege and racialized stereotyping, we must
strive to expose the ugly side of criminal justice. Exposure can take many
forms: from creating an environment that permits victims of racist prac-
tices to tell their stories to ensuring that stories get told and that context
is provided even when the best storytellers are absent.
Beyond creating classrooms that lend themselves to questioning the
assumptions and hierarchies that undergird much case law, we may need
to radically re-think the way some courses are taught. The revered "case
method" gives a cramped view of the multiplicity of factors governing
our criminal justice system and may be peculiarly inappropriate in the
context of teaching constitutional criminal procedure. Stories about inva-
sive searches of innocents can round out review of cases where defendants
are invariably guilty. Scholarly articles can expose underlying racist as-
sumptions and can illuminate practices such as racial profiling.
The brute force of reductive Scalian analysis notwithstanding, the
Whren decision did not flow inevitably from the words of the Fourth
Amendment; indeed, it is counter to most intuitive norms of what is "rea-
sonable'"Where malleable terms like "reasonable" are at issue,judges enjoy
great freedom to impose value judgments and policy preferences. By con-
textualizing cases and the judicial decision making process, and by moving
beyond that relatively narrow sphere to consider the broader workaday
street justice reality, we arm and embolden our students to critique and
change, and not just accept, a deeply flawed and racialized criminal justice
system.
FALL 2009]
